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I. Introduction
"State of the art" has become a touchstone for manufacturer resistance to
strict products liability, and the political forces thus mobilized are well served
by their linguistic choice. As a campaign slogan, state of the art panders to
a consumer society which frequently buys on the basis of that very producer
representation. It conjures up the picture of an industry on the brink of financial
ruin, despite its suggested presence on the cutting edge of research and
development.
In contrast with and outwardly detached from such political concerns,
conventional wisdom has long suggested that the admissibility of state of
the art evidence in a products liability case should be arelatively straightforward
issue. Subject to a few case-by-case exceptions premised on overly prejudicial
evidence, the admissibility issue should follow logically from a jurisdiction's
substantive products liability doctrine. However, several factors have conspired
to make such a structure elusive. First, there is still considerable confusion
as to exactly what state of the art means. Second, the recent examination
of state of the art issues by state supreme courts has coincided with a new
wave of judicial retrenchment from strict liability. Third, spurred by cyclical
supposed insurance crises, state and federal legislatures have shown con-
siderable interest in tampering with all aspects of the common law products
liability system, including state of the art issues.
II. Allocation Models and Operational Rules
Products liability regimes which eschew either causation (absolute)1 or producer
conduct (negligence) 2 liability models signify their acceptance of a strict
* Q 1991 Nicolas P. Terry, All Rights Reserved.
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1. See e.g., Thibault v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 118 N.H. 802,395 A.2d 843, 845-46 (1978)
("Unlike workmen's compensation and no-fault automobile insurance, strict liability
is not a no-fault system of compensation"). Cf. Kirkland v. General Motors Corporation,
521 P.2d 1353, 1363 (Okla. 1974).
This conceptual underpinning also serves to distinguish common law products
liability from governmental command-control safety regulations. See e.g., Chrysler
Corporation v. Department of Transportation, 472 F.2d 659, 671-73 (6th Cir. 1972)
(NHTSA is empowered to issue standards which will require development of safer
technology).
2. Cf. Friend v. GeneralMotors Corp., 118 Ga. App. 763,165 S.E.2d 734 (1968) (Pannell,
J., dissenting), reversed by Ga. Code Ann. §§ 105-106 (1968). See also Casrell v. Altec
Industries, Inc., 335 So.2d 128 (Ala. 1976) (negligence as a matter of law).
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liability allocation model by tying risk redistribution ("compensation") to
product "defectiveness." 3 On a case-by-case, or operational level that defect
inquiry involves three aspects: identification, contextualization and evalu-
ation. Typically, the plaintiff has the burden of identifying what went wrong
with the product (its "factual" defect4), that the defect arose in the context
of some intended or foreseeable use of the product,5 and that the product
was "legally defective." 6 It is this last, evaluative stage which has engendered
the most discussion and the largest number of jurisdictional variations.
7
The "consumer expectations" test for legal defectiveness, 8 which first saw
duty as the Restatement test,9 has had limited appeal as an operational rule
for complex design defect cases. 10 Primarily, this is because "the consumer
simply does not have adequate information to know what to expect."1 1
Consistent with that observation, the generally disparaged consumer expec-
tations test continues to see some limited utilization in manufacturing defect
3. See e.g., Caterpillar Tractor Co. v. Beck, 593 P.2d 871, 877 (Alaska 1979); O'Brien
v. Muskin Corporation, 94 N.J. 169, 463 A.2d 298, 303 (1982).
4. See e.g., Heaton v. Ford Motor Co., 248 Or. 467, 435 P.2d 806 (1967); Williams v.
Smart Chevrolet Co., 292 Ark. 376, 730 S.W.2d 479 (1987); Jones v. General Motors
Corp., 557 So.2d 1259 (Ala. 1990) (negligence action); McLaughlin v. Michelin Tire
Corp., 778 P.2d 59, 64 (Wyo. 1989) ("defect in fact").
This issue frequently, and understandably, is intermingled with other, essentially factual,
issues such as whether the defect existed at the time the product left the hands of the
producer, and the cause-in-fact relationship between the product and the plaintiffs
injury. See e.g., Hebecker v. Copperloy Corp., 893 F.2d 49, 54 (3d Cir. 1990). Cf.
Blueflame Gas, Inc. v. Van Hoose, 679 P.2d 579 (Colo. 1984) (consumer's burden on
issue of timing of defect limited to proving existence of defect at time of purchase
or first use).
5. See e.g., McLaughlin v. Michelin Tire Corp., 778 P.2d 59, 82 (Wyo. 1989) (Per Urbigkit,
J., dissenting and concurring, "It is axiomatically necessary to address intended use
in relation to defect"); O'Brien v. Muskin Corporation, 94 N.J. 169, 463 A.2d 298,
303 (1983). A jurisdiction's exact choice of use-limiting language will have allocational
effects because some uses which are not "intended" by the manufacturer may still be
characterized as "foreseeable." Similar terminology reoccurs at the fine-tuning affirma-
tive defence level in determining whether certain consumer uses involve colourable
"fault."
6. I describe and distinguish "Factual Defect" and "Legal Defectiveness" at Terry, Stricter
Products Liability, 52 Mo. L.Rev. 1, 21-24 (1987).
7. See generally Twerski, From Risk-Utility to Consumer Expectations: Enhancing the
Rose ofJudicialScreening inProductLiabilityLitigation, 11 Hofstra L. Rev. 861(1983).
8. See, e.g., De Battista v. Argonaut.Southwest Ins. Co., 403 So.2d 26, 30 (La. 1981)
("'Unreasonably dangerous' means simply that the article which injured the plaintiff
was dangerous to an extent beyond that which would be contemplated by an ordinary
consumer").
9. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 402A, comment g.
10. See the forceful critiques in Dart v. Wiebe Mfg., Inc., 147 Ariz. 242, 709 P.2d 876,
878-79 (1985), and Camacho v. Honda Motor Co., Ltd., 741 P.2d 1240, 1245-46 (Colo.
1987), cert.dismd, 485 U.S. 101,108 S.Ct. 1067, 99 L.Ed.2d 229 (1988). See generally
Nichols v. Union Underwear Co., 602 S.W.2d 429 (Ky. 1980). Cf. Riordan v.International
Armament Corp., 132 Ill.App.3d 642, 87 I11.Dec. 765, 477 N.E.2d 1293 (1985);
Rahmig v. Mosley Machinery Co., 226 Neb. 423, 412 NW.2d 56, 69-70 (1987);
Castrignano v. E.R. Squibb & Sons, Inc., 546 A.2d 775 (R.I. 1988).
11. O'Brien v. Muskin Corporation, 94 N.J. 169, 463 A.2d 298, 308 (1982) (per Clifford
J., concurring).
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cases1 2 and non-complex design cases. 13 However, jurisdictions which
otherwise persist with the consumer expectations formulation treat it, not as
the defectiveness ultimate issue, but rather as a thin veneer disguising a risk-
utility analysis. 14 That risk-utility test, also described as the "prudent
manufacturer" 15 or "hindsight" 16 test, dominates the modern law governing
legal defectiveness. 17 A few states have elected to retain the manipulable
Restatement-based "defective condition unreasonably dangerous" approach
as their ultimate issue. 18 However, the only theoretically respectable
competition for the unadorned risk-utility test is the composite, or dual,
12. Where consumer expectations may be accurately approximated by the manufacturer's
expectations. See Dart v. Wiebe Mfg., Inc., 147 Ariz. 242, 709 P.2d 876, 878 (1985).
13. See, e.g., Dart v. Wiebe Mfg., Inc., 147 Ariz. 242, 709 P.2d 876, 882 (1985). Note
further that this role in non-complex cases probably explains the continued presence
of a consumer expectations component in the dual or composite test for design defect.
See text accompanying note 19, infra. Cf. In re Hawaii Federal Asbestos Cases, 665
F.Sup. 1454, 1456 (D. Hawaii 1986) (viewing the risk-utility prong as the "fall back"
position).
14. See e.g., Nerud v. Haybuster Mfg., Inc., 215 Neb. 604,340 N.W.2d 369,375-76 (1983),
rev'd in Rahmig v. Mosley Machinery Co., 226 Neb. 423,412 N.W.2d 56,69-70 (1987);
Seattle-First National Bank v. Tabert, 86 Wash.2d 145, 542 P.2d 774 (1975) (using
risk/benefit to determine the reasonable expectations of the consumer); Falk v. Keene
Corporation, 113 Wash.2d 645,782 P.2d 974 (1989); Sumnitch v. Toyota Motor Sales,
U.S.A., Inc., 121 Wis.2d 338, 360 N.W.2d 2,15-19 (1984).
It is arguable that some jurisdictions continue to express an interest in the consumer
expectations test because it may be massaged to produce a higher level of redistribution.
See e.g., Kisor v. Johns-Manville Corp., 783 F.2d 1337 (9th Cir. 1986) (applying law
of Washington); Toliver v. General Motors Corp., 482 So.2d 213, 218 (Miss. 1985);
Nesselrode v. Executive Beechcraft, Inc., 707 S.W.2d 371 (Mo. 1986). See also Kams
v. Emerson Electric Co., 817 F.2d 1452,1459 (10th Cir. 1987) (supplying dubious
content to consumer expectations by permitting expert to testify as to that ultimate issue).
15. See e.g., Phillips v. Kimwood Machine Co., 269 Or. 485, 525 P.2d 1033,1036 (1974);
Morningstar v. Black and Decker Manufacturing Co., 253 S.E.2d 666, 683 (W.Va.
1979).
16. See e.g., Dart v. Wiebe Mfg., Inc., 147 Ariz. 242, 709 P.2d 876, 881(1985).
17. See e.g., Haas v. United Technologies Corp., 450 A.2d 1173,1176 (Del. 1982); Radiation
Technology, Inc. v. Ware Construction Co., 445 So.2d 329, 331 (Fla. 1983); Thibault
v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 118 N.H. 802, 395 A.2d 843, 847-48 (1978); Cepeda v.
Cumberland Engineering Co., 76 N.J. 152, 386 A.2d 816, 825-27 (1978); O'Brien Y.
Muskin Corporation, 94 N.J. 169, 463 A.2d 298, 304 (1983); Voss v. Black & Decker
Mfg. Co., 59 N.Y.2d 102,450 N.E.2d 204,208-209,463 N.Y.S.2d 398 (1983); Wilson
v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 282 Or. 61, 577 P.2d 1322 (1978); Turner v. General Motors
Corp., 584 S.W.2d 844, 849 (Tex. 1979).
This approach is neither exclusively a common law one, nor is it perceived nec-
essarily as allocationally biased against producers. For example, some otherwise re-
formist statutes use the risk-utility approach. See e.g., La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 9:2800.56
(West Supp. 1989). See also Falk v. Keene Corporation, 113 Wash.2d 645, 782 P.2d
974 (1989). Indeed, it was the defendant in Caterpillar Tractor Co. v. Beck, 593 P.2d
871 (Alaska 1979), who requested the application of a risk-utility analysis, 593 P.2d
at 877, only to see defeat snatched from the jaws of victory when the court reversed
the burden of proof on that very issue, 593 P.2d at 885-86.
18. See e.g., Nesselrode v. Executive Beechcraft, Inc., 707 S.W.2d 371 (Mo. 1986).
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approach, under which the plaintiff may choose consumer expectations or
risk-utility.
19
Having identified the risk (factual defect) and contextualized the defect
analysis (foreseeable use), theevaluative stage determines whether the product
is legally defective. A product is legally defective if:
(1) Its dangerousness as designed or manufactured outweighs its utility
when contrasted with alternate feasible designs or manufacture, or
(2) Notwithstanding the product's utility and a lack of any alternate design
or manufacture, the product's dangerousness is not adequately warned
against, or
(3) Notwithstanding the lack of any alternate design or manufacture its
dangerousness, although adequately warned against, outweighs its util-
ity. 20
As follows from above, 21 a products liability regime aspiring to a quan-
titative risk redistribution somewhere between absolute and negligence
19. See e.g., Knitz v. Minster Machine Co., 69 Ohio St.2d 460, 23 Ohio Op.3d 403, 432
N.E.2d 814, 818 (1982), cert. den. 459 U.S. 857 (1982):
[A] product design is in a defective condition to the user or consumer if (1) it is
more dangerous than an ordinary consumer would expect when used in an intended
or reasonably foreseeable manner, or (2) if the benefits of the challenged design
do not outweigh the risk inherent in such design. Factors relevant to the evaluation
of the defectiveness of the product design are the likelihood that the product design
will cause injury, the gravity of the danger posed, and the mechanical and economic
feasibility of an improved design.
See also Dart Y. Wiebe Mfg., Inc., 147 Ariz. 242, 709 P.2d 876 (1985).
A small number of jurisdictions utilize this dual approach, but with a burden shift
on the risk/benefit element. See Barker v, Lull Engineering Co., 20 Cal.3d 413, 143
Cal.Rptr. 225, 239, 573 P.2d 443, 457-58 (1978); Caterpillar Tractor Co. v. Beck, 593
P.2d 871 (Alaska 1979); In re Hawaii Federal Asbestos Cases, 665 F.Supp. 1454 (D.
Hawaii 1986).
20. See generally Thibault v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 118 N.H. 802, 395 A.2d 843, 846
(1978); Freund v. Cellofilm Properties, Inc., 87 N.J. 229,432 A.2d 925, 930-32 (1981);
Beshada v. Johns-Manville Products Corp., 90 N.J. 191, 447 A.2d 539, 544-45 (1982);
O'Brien v. Muskin Corporation, 94 N.J. 169, 463 A.2d 298, 306 (1983); Castrignano
v. E.R. Squibb & Sons, Inc., 546 A.2d 775, 781 (R.I. 1988).
Of these propositions, clearly it is the third which is the most controversial because
it contemplates a product which passes the risk-utility test (in the sense of no feasible
alternative) and incorporates adequate warnings, but which fails the risk-utility test
in the sense that a reasonable manufacturer would conclude that the product should
not be produced at all. Indeed, Restatement (Second) of Torts § 402A comment i states:
Many products cannot possibly be made entirely safe for all consumption, and any
food or drug necessarily involves some risk or harm, if only from over-consumption
.... The article sold must be dangerous to an extent beyond that which would be
contemplated by the ordinary consumer who purchases it, with the ordinary knowl-
edge common to the community as to its characteristics ... Good tobacco is not
unreasonably dangerous merely because the effects of smoking may be harmful;
but tobacco containing something like marijuana may be unreasonably dangerous.
Good butter is not unreasonably dangerous merely because, if such be the case,
it deposits cholesterol in the arteries and leads to heart attacks; but bad butter,
contaminated with poisonous fish oil, is unreasonably dangerous.
A frontal attack has been mounted on the Restatement position in the cigarette cases.
See, e.g., Dewey v. R. J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 121 NJ. 69, 577 A.2d 1239 (1990)
(rejecting "good tobacco" argument). See also O'Brien, supra, 463 A.2d at 310-15 (per
Schreiber, J., concurring and dissenting).
21. See text accompanying footnote 2, supra.
ANGLO-AMERICAN LAW REVIEW
liability models, traditionally is described in terms of a strict liability al-
location model.22 The agreed allocation is realized through the adoption of
operational rules (or doctrine) which, in the aggregate, will achieve a quantitative
risk redistribution consistent with the allocation model.23 The relationship
between the allocation model and its operational rules is dynamic and in-
formational. This is because the strict liability allocation model is relatively
unrefined. Thus, the operational rules serve to inform ofjurisdictional variations
concerning the exact amount of redistribution to be achieved.
Adoption of the risk-utility test for legal defectiveness as the primary
operational rule is consistent with a strict liability allocation model. Primarily,
it serves to distance strict from absolute liability. However, it also tends to
confuse strict with negligence products liability.24 It may be the case that
"[a]lmost since the [strict liability] rule's inception, courts have tended to
borrow common law concepts of negligence in determining whether a
manufactured product, as designed, is unreasonably dangerous." 25 However,
it is inaccurate to depict the strict liability risk-utility analysis as "the rea-
sonable care balancing test."26 Courts consistently have distinguished strict
liability risk-utility analysis from its negligence manifestation. Conceptually,
that distinction is characterized by the statement that strict liability judges
the product not the producer;27 i.e., it is not a negligence-style judgment of
conduct.28 Indeed, risk-utility analysis is particularly appropriate as a strict
liability operational rule because of its intrinsically impersonal character-
istics.
22. I take the view that in only strict liability - not absolute liability - it is possible for
a plaintiff to fail to make her case, even though she has shown factual defect, foreseeable
use and cause in fact. See note 1, supra. A pithier summary would be that in strict
liability systems "unsafe" products are not always defective. Unfortunately, some
apparently strict liability systems use a "safe"-"unsafe" dichotomy as their defectiveness
determinant, thus rendering the terminology ambiguous.
An alternative distinction which I do not invoke turns on non-availability in absolute
liability systems of certain affirmative defences (e.g., contributory fault) traditionally
available in fault and strict liability regimes. See, e.g., Crislip v. TCH Liquidating Co.,
52 Ohio St. 3d 251, 556 N.E.2d 1177,1183 (1990) (specifically noting the defence of
comparative fault as the only distinction between strict and negligence warning cases);
Higgins v. E.I. Du Pont de Nemours & Co. Inc., 671 F.Supp. 1055, 1060 (D. Md. 1987)
(strict liability characterized by immunity from negligence-based affirmative defences).
23. Take, for example, the evolution of design defect products doctrine in California.
Greenman v. Yuba Power Products, Inc., 59 Cal.2d 57, 27 Cal.Rptr. 697, 377 P.2d
897 (1963), introduced, for all the traditional meta-legal reasons, a strict liability
allocation model. Greenman, however, failed to provide any operational rules. Opera-
tional rules subsequently were suggested by Cronin v. J.B.E. Olson Corp., 8 Cal.3d
121,104 Cal.Rptr. 433,501 P.2d 1153 (1972), but were inconsistent with the allocational
model because they redistributed too many product-related risks. As a result the
(perational rules were re-formulated in Barker v. LullEngineering Co., 20 Cal.3d 413,143
Cal.Rptr. 225, 239, 573 P.2d 443, 457-58 (1978). See note 19, supra.
24. Primarily because risk-utility analysis emerged as a major negligence liability deter-
minant following United States v. Carroll Towing Co., 159 F.2d 169 (2d Cir. 1947)
(per Learned Hand, J.).
25. Kallio v. Ford Motor Company, 407 N.W.2d 92, 95 (Minn. 1987).
26. Kallio v. Ford Motor Company, 407 N.W.2d 92, 95 (Minn. 1987). See also Albertson
v. Volkswagenwerk A.G., 230 Kan. 368, 634 P.2d 1127,1131 (Kan. 1981).
27. See, e.g., Dart v. Wiebe Mfg., Inc., 147 Ariz. 242, 709 P.2d 876, 880 (1985). See also
Blevins v. Cushman Motors, 551 S.W.2d 602, 608 (Mo. 1977); Roach v. Kononen, 269
Or. 457, 525 P.2d 125,129 (1974).
28. The conduct-oriented/product-oriented dichotomy is a convenient shorthand.
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Importantly, an allocation model may be made"strict" other than by making
the basic liability determinant more objective. It is axiomatic that negligence
liability hinges on the unreasonable running of a foreseeable risk.Z9 Thus,
a negligence allocation model attracts operational rules phrased in terms of
both reasonable conduct and risk identification. Modification of either aspect
of that duopoly may result in a shift from a fault-based to a strict liability
allocation model.30 In the case of strict products liability, that shift regarding
producer foresight has been achieved through a conclusive presumption that
the manufacturer knew of the risks associated with her product (imputed
foresight).31 It is crucial to an appreciation of modem design defect doctrine 32
to understand that this presumption is conclusive, extending beyond the level
of an evidentiary presumption. Whether the defendant knew or could have
known of the risks is irrelevant. 33
El. State of the Art Terminology
As a frequently encountered, consumer-friendly term state of the art projects
a beguiling simplicity. However, it is a schizophrenic concept, the logic of
which has faltered in attempting to be all things to all people.34 State of the
29. See, e.g., Blyth v. Birmingham Water Works Co., 11 Exch. 781, 156 Eng. Rep. 1047,
1049, [1843-601 All E.R. Rep. 478 (1856); Restatement (Second) of Torts § 284 (1965).
The requirement of actual or constructive foresight of risk is an explicit component
of negligence-based products liability. See Restatement (Second) of Torts § 395 (1965).
30. Cf. Beshada, supra, 447 A.2d at 544, apparently, and erroneously, implying that
imputing foresight is a different way to state a shift to a conduct-oriented standard.
A similar implication is to be found in the similarly strict(er) approach in Kisor v. Johns-
Manville Corp., 783 F.2d 1337 (9th Cir. 1986) (applying law of Washington).
31. See, e.g.,Phillips v. KimwoodMachine Co., 269 Or. 485,525 P.2d 1033,1036-37 (1974);
Roach v. Kononen, 269 Or. 457, 525 P.2d 125,129 (1974); Nesselrode v. Executive
Beechcraft, Inc., 707 S.W.2d 371, 375 n.4 (Mo. 1986); Cepeda v. Cumberland En-
gineering Co., 76 N.J. 152, 386 A.2d 816, 821(1978). For a civilian phrasing of this
concept, see also Myers v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co., 493 So.2d
1170,1171 n.6 (La. 1986). See also Wade, On the Nature of Strict Tort Liability for
Products, 44 Miss. L.J. 825, 825-26 (1973).
32. Much of this article will be concerned with whetherthis statement also applies to warning
cases. See text accompanying note 73 et seq., infra.
33. See e.g., Beshada v. Johns-Manville Products Corp., 90 N.J. 191, 447 A.2d 539, 544
n.3 (1982).
34. See e.g., Suter v. San AngeloFoundry& Mach. Co., 81 N.J. 150,406A.2d140,151(1979)
("[Tihe state of the art refers not only to the common practice and standards in the
industry but also to other design alternatives within practical and technological limits
at the time of distribution.") See also Murphy v. Owens-Illinois, Inc., 779 F.2d 340,
342 (6th Cir. 1985) (applying the law of Tennessee) ("In a consideration of the 'state
of the art,' available scientific and technological knowledge, customary practice and
industry standards are all relevant.")
Cf. Lenhardt v. Ford Motor Co., 102 Wash. 2d 208, 683 P.2d 1097 (1984):
[W]e must distinguish between two types of evidence that may be introduced in
a product liability action, state of the art evidence and evidence of industry custom.
se concepts are not always synonymous and, as such, involve different types
of evidence. The former relates to the technological feasibility of alternative safer
designs in existence at the time the product was originally manufactured while the
latter refers to a practice or custom regarding a particular design or manufacturing
technique utilized by most manufacturers in that industry.
(citation omitted).
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art is defined by two variables: the substance, or "art" referred to; and the
point in time, or "state," at which the art is measured. 35 The former includes
the practices of a particular industry, available technology and the knowledge
and discoverability of product-related risks. Of course, the latter, the timing
element, is infinitely variable. In actuality, however, products liability is
concerned with the time of marketing and the time of trial. As a composite,
therefore, the state of art appellation refers to several time-slice contexts for
producer conduct, expertise or cognizance. 36 The dominant issues in the
admissibility of state of the art evidence are: first, the practice of an industry
or its members at the time of marketing (industry practice) ; the available
technology at the time of marketing (industry capability) ; and knowledge
and discoverability of product-related risks at the time of trial (industry
unknowability).
Unquestionably, whatever the precise allocation model or operational rule
a jurisdiction adopts, producers and consumers are going to have contrasting
views as to the admissibility of evidence concerning industry conduct, expertise
or cognizance. However, from a structural perspective, state of the art poses
three additional questions. First, are the state of the art rules which operate
under the strict liability allocation model mere logically derived sub-rules
operating to enforce the primary operational rules, or do they exist as in-
dependent operational rules? Second, are state of the art rules allocationally
neutral, or do they function as a fine-tuning technique to reflect how "strict"
a particular jurisdiction's products liability doctrine will be? Third, if the
state of the art rules have an independent operational role, are they consistent
with the allocation model or the primary operational rule?
IV. State of the Art as an Evidentiary Rule
For the majority of jurisdictions the state of the art issue has not been
reduced to a blanket rule to admit or exclude all such evidence. 37 Indeed,
any such proscription would fail to do justice to the complexity of the state
of art concept. The key factor distinguishing the ways the various state of
the art issues are resolved is the type of defect allegation involved. Indeed,
there is significant potential for error when a state of the art admissibility
question is answered by reference to decisional law dealing with a species
of evidence or allegation of defect of a different type from that in the case
at bar.38 In the following sections admissibility of state of the art evidence
35. A third variable concerns the party adducing the evidence. Most of whatfollows concerns
defensive evidence. Plaintiffs' utilization of offensive state of the art evidence is considered
at note 44, infra .
36. See e.g., Lohrmann v. Pittsburgh Corning Corp., 782 F.2d 1156,1164 (4th Cir. 1986)
(aplying the law of Maryland).
37. Cf.Elmore v. Owens-Illinois, Inc., 673 S.W.2d 434, 438 (Mo. 1984).
38. See e.g., Kisor v. Johns-Manville Corp., 783 F.2d 1337 (9th Cir. 1986) (applying the
law of Washington) (holding that defendant's proffered evidence of industry unknowability
in a warning case was inadmissable on the basis of Lenhardt v. Ford Motor Co, 102
Wash.2d 208, 683 P.2d 1097 (1984), holding that evidence of industry custom was
not admissible in design defect case). See also Santiago v. Johnson Machine and Press
Corp., 834 F.2d 84, 85 (3d Cir. 1987) (arguably excluding industry capability evidence
on authority of state case excluding evidence of industry practice).
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is examined in the context of the most problematic of familiar products
liability allegations: design defect and failure to warn.
39
A. Design Defect
Whatever a jurisdiction's doctrinal approach to the theory of defectiveness
for design cases, it is clear that "[c]onsistency with industry-wide practices
has never been conclusive in strict liability or negligence actions." 40 Such
a conclusion inevitabl flows from the famous opinion of Judge Learned Hand
in The T.J. Hooper.l Notwithstanding, such evidence has always been
relevant to a products liability action brought under a negligence theory.
42
However, at the very least it seems true that "[i]n cases predicated upon strict
liability, evidence of industry standards has even less probative value." 4 3
Indeed any attempt to introduce defensive evidence 44 of industry custom is
39. Manufacturing defect, or quality control, litigation is not examined. In such cases the
question of legal defectiveness is answered conclusively by reference to the state of
the art evidenced bythe producer's own demonstrated ability to manufacture the product
absent the defect. To put it another way, state of the art evidence as discussedin this
article is irrelevant in manufacturing defect cases. See Reed v. Tiffin Motor Homes,
Inc., 697 F.2d 1192 (4th Cir. 1982) ("In manufacturing defect cases courts have excluded
evidence of the state of the art because the plaintiff need only show the product does
not conform to the manufacturer's specifications to prove it is defective"). See also
Sturm, Ruger & Co., v. Day, 594 P.2d 38, 44 (Alaska 1979).
40. Caterpillar Tractor Co. v. Beck, 593 P.2d 871, 881 n.30 (Alaska 1979).
41. 60 F.2d 737, 740 (2d Cir. 1932) ("[Industry] never may set its own tests, however
persuasive be its usages").
42. Seee.g.,Rossellv. Volkswagen ofAmerica, 147Ariz. 160,709 P.2d517,523-24 (1985);
Garst v. General Motors Corp., 207 Kan. 2, 484 P.2d 47, 61(1971).
43. Sturm, Ruger & Co., Inc. v. a, 594 P.2d 38, 45 (Alaska 1979). See also Carter v.
Massey-Ferguson, Inc., 716 F.2d 344, 347-49 (5th Cir. 1983) (applying the law of
Texas).
44. The plaintiff is not required to introduce offensive industry custom evidence. See Horn
v. General Motors Corp., 17 Cal.3d 359, 131 Cal.Rptr. 78, 551 P.2d 398, 402 (1976).
Many plaintiffs, however, choose to introduce such evidence. See, e.g., Bly v. Otis
Elevator Co., 713 F.2d 1040,1043 (4th Cir. 1983) (applying the law of Virginia). Of
course, if the plaintiff does introduce evidence of industry custom that will open the
door for the defendant. See, e.g Walker v. Trico Mfg., Co., 487 F.2d 595, 600 (7th
Cir. 1973), cert. den. 94 S.Ct. 1564 (1974); Kisor v. Johns-Manville Corp., 783 F.2d
1337,1340 n.7 (9th Cir. 1986) (applying the Law of Washington). See also note 54,
infra.
The fact that a certain type of evidence is admissible does not dispose of the admissibility
in a particular case. Consider, for example, plaintiff evidence of offensive custom, which
may be unfairly preudicial. See, e.g., Johnson v. Armstrong Cork Co., 645 F. Supp.
764, 767-68 (W.. La. 1986):
The danger of unfair prejudice is readily apparent. The state-of-the-art evidence
which plaintiffs seek to introduce dates back to the 1930s and 40s. This evidence
is highly suggestive of the fact that manufacturers knew, or should have known,
that friable asbestos products were likely to cause substantial lung injury to those
who came in contact with the product. For historical accuracy, the plaintiffs might
as well go all the way back to ancient civilization. "The adverse biological effects
of asbestos (the word comes from a Greek adjective meaning "inextinguishable")
were observed as early as the First Century by the Greek geographer Strabo and
by the Roman naturalist Pliny the Elder, both of whom mentioned in passing a
sickness of the lungs in slaves whose task was to weave asbestos into cloth." T.
Brodeur, Annals of Law, "The Asbestos Industry on Trial," The New Yorker, at
57 (June 10, 1985).
Thus, for a long period of time (one might even say, "forever," if Strabo and
Pliny are to be believed), manufacturers of asbestos knew of the danger to which
plaintiffs were exposed. Viewed in this light, plaintiff's exposure to the dangers
of asbestos ap r needless and senseless; the manufacturer s failure to take steps
to minimize hese dangers appears callous.
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untenable. The following reasoning is compelling:
Introducing evidence of industry and/or manufacturer's customs and
practices shifts the jury's focus from what the consumer expects to what
the manufacturers are doing. By focusing the jury's attention on the custom
of the industry, implicitly the jury's attention is focused on the defendant's
design choice and the reasonableness of that choice. In effect, such evidence
incorporates negligence concepts and the seller oriented approach we
[have] rejected... 45
In a jurisdiction in which risk-utility is the operational rule for legal
defectiveness, the defect issue will depend upon whether the plaintiff has
introduced sufficient evidence of the existence of an alternative
technologically feasible design.46 Indeed, the core issues posed by today's
accepted definitions of "defective unreasonably dangerous" simply cannot
be addressed absent such evidence. 47 Admitting evidence of industry ca-
pability involves neither the admissibility of industry custom nor the abrogation
of that basic tenet of products doctrine: to judge the product, not the manu-
45. Lenhardt v. Ford Motor Co., 102 Wash.2d 208, 683 P.2d 1097,1098 (1984).
46. See, e.g., Knitz v. Minster Machine Co., 69 Ohio St.2d 460, 23 Ohio Op.3d 403, 432
N.E.2d 814, 818 (1982), cert. den. 459 U.S. 857 (1982), text accompanying note 19,
supra; Vanskike v. ACF Industries, Inc., 665 F.2d 188, 195 (8th Cir. 1981) (applying
the law of Missouri) cert. den. 455 U.S. 1000, 71 L.Ed.2d 867, 102 S.Ct. 1632 (1982);
Rix v. General Motors Corp., 222 Mont. 318, 723 P.2d 195, 201 (1986); Erickson v.
Monarch Industries, Inc., 216 Neb. 875, 347 N.W.2d 99, 110 (1984); Johnson v. Clark
Equip. Co., 274 Or. 463,547 P.2d 132,136-37 n.1 (1976); Voss v. Black & Decker Mfg.,
Co., 59 N.Y.2d 102,450 N.E.2d 204,209-10,463 N.Y.S.2d 398 (1983); Wilson v. Piper
Aircraft Corp., 282 Or. 61,577 P.2d 1322 (1978), reh'g denied, 282 Or. 411,579 P.2d
1287 (1978); Nerud v. Haybuster Mfg., Inc., 215 Neb. 604, 340 N.W.2d 369 (1983);
BoatlandofHouston, Inc. v. Bailey, 609 S.W.2d 743,746 (Tex. 1980); Church v. Wesson,
385 S.E.2d 393, 396 (W.Va. 1989). See also Omnetics, Inc. v. Radiant Technology
Corp., 440 N.W.2d 177,181 (Minn. Ct. App. 1989) (confirming technologically feasible
alternative to be at the root of the legal defectiveness issue and noting counsel's freedom
to argue it, but upholding trial court's refusal to give elaborate jury instruction defining
and describing the concept).
In a few jurisdictions the defectiveness issue will depend upon whether the defendant
has introduced sufficient evidence of infeasibility. See Barker v. Lull Engineering Co.,
20 Cal.3d 413, 143 Cal.Rptr. 225,239,573 P.2d 443,457-58 (1978); Caterpillar Tractor
Co. v. Beck, 593 P.2d 871 (Alaska 1979).
47. See, e.g., Reed v. Tiffin Motor Homes, Inc., 697 F.2d 1192 (4th Cir. 1982) (applying
the law of South Carolina); Norton v. Snapper Power Equip., Div. of Fuqua Industries,
Inc., 806 F.2d 1545,1549 (1 1th Cir. 1987) (applying the Law of Florida); McLaughlin
v. Sikorsky Aircraft, 148 Cal.App.3d 203,195 Cal.Rptr. 764,767 (1983); Kerns v. Engelke,
76 l1.2d 154, 28 1ll.Dec. 500, 390 N.E.2d 859,865 (1979); Falk v. Keene Corporation,
113 Wash.2d 645,782 P.2d 974 (1989). Cf. Couch v. Mine Safety Appliances Co., 728
P.2d 585 (Wash. 1986); French v. Grove Mfg., Co., 656 F.2d 295, 298 (8th Cir. 1981)
(applying the Law of Arkansas, feasible alternative is not a necessary ingredient of
plamtiff's case); Sumnicht v. Toyota Motor Sales, U.S.A., Inc., 121 Wis.2d 338, 360
.W.2d 2,16-17 (1984). See also Johnson v. Raybestos-Manhattan, Inc., 69 Hawaii
287, 740 P.2d 548, 549 n.3 (1987) (leaving question open).
I admit of two exceptions to this assertion that evidence of industry capability is
the key to the design defect case: the first, and not really an exception, is where the
product is not technologically complex; the second is where plaintiff's factual defect
allegation is that the product is too dangerous notwithstanding its utility. On this latter
type of case, see Kallio v. Ford Motor Co., 407 N.W.2d 92, 97 n.8 (Minn. 1987). Note
that Kallio itself recognized that, as a practical matter, successful plaintiffs introduce
evidence of alternative safer designs. See 407 N.W.2d at 96 n.6.
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facturer. 48 In any "feasibility" jurisdiction,49 there is no viable argument
against the admissibility of evidence of industry capability at the time of
marketing; it is the key concept which must be addressed.
Imputed foresight, the second major operational rule derived from a strict
liability allocation model is well established in design defect litigation. As
a result of imputing knowledge of a product's dangerous propensity to the
manufacturer, 50 "[t]he quality of the product may be measured not only by
the information available to the manufacturer at the time of design, but also
by the information available to the trier of fact at the time of the trial." 51
That is, evidence at the time of trial of the product's dangerousness is imputed
to the manufacturer for the purpose of determining through a risk-utility
analysis whether a different design - given industry capability at the time
of manufacture - should have been utilized. 52 Because knowledge of the
product-related risk is tested at the time of trial, it follows that, in a design
defect case, evidence of the unknowability of a product-related risk at the
time of manufacture (industry unknowability) is irrelevant.5 3
Thus, in design cases the state of the art answers which are logically derived
from the two dominant operational rules (risk-utility and imputed foresight)
are that defensive evidence of either industry practice54 or unknowability
should be ruled inadmissible, whereas evidence of industry capability at the
time of marketing is necessarily admissible. The more difficult state of the
art questions remaining are those which are not so obviously answered by
reference to the operational rules. First, may evidence of industry practice
be introduced, ostensibly to demonstrate lack of feasibility? Second, does
the general rule against the admissibility of explicitly custom-based evidence
apply with equal force to evidence of either an industry's self-regulatory
standards (industry standards) or standards imposed on the industry by state
or federal governmental agencies (regulatory standards)?
48. Cf. Norton v. Snapper Power Equip., Div. of Fuqua Industries, Inc., 806 F.2d 1545,
1549 n.3 (11 th Cir. 1987) (suggesting that admission of state of the art evidence always
"infuses some measure of 'fault' analysis into the strict liability equation.") See also
Toliver v. General Motors Corp., 482 So.2d 213,218 (Miss. 1985) (apparently rejecting
risk-utility because negligence based, but arguably in the context of adopting a stricter
allocation model based on "liability for a product solely due to its performance").
49. This is true even if the jurisdiction persists in utilizing the consumer expectations test.
See Bruce v. Martin-Marietta Corp., 544 F.2d 442, 447 (10th Cir. 1976) ("'State-of-
art' evidence helps to determine the expectation of the ordinary consumer").
50. See text accompanying note 31, supra.
51. Dart v. Wiebe Mg., Inc., 147 Ariz. 242, 709 P.2d 876, 881 (1985).
52. See, e.g., Cepeda v. Cumberland Engineering Co., Inc., 76 N.J. 152, 386 A.2d 816,
821,825 (1978); Dart v. Wiebe Mfg., Inc., 147 Ariz. 242,709 P.2d 876, 880-81 (1985);
St. Germain v. Husqvarna Corporation, 544 A.2d 1283,1286-88 (Me. 1988) (Glassman,
J., dissenting).
53. See, e.g., Johnson v. Raybestos-Manhattan, Inc., 69 Hawaii 287, 740 P.2d 548, 549
(1987); In re Hawaii Federal Asbestos Cases, 665 F.Supp. 1454, 1456-58 (D. Hawaii
1986).
54. Cf. D.L. v. Huebner, 110 Wis.2d 581, 329 N.W.2d 890, 905-909 (1983) (offensive
evidence of post-manufacture custom admissible to show feasibility). Accord, Jackson
v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 779 F.2d 1047,1056-58 (5th Cir. 1986) (applying the
law of Texas).
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Two reasons are given to justify the indirect relevance of industry practice.
The first is that consumer expectations are partly formed by producer practice.
Thus, a jurisdiction which uses the consumer expectations test as its opera-
tional rule or which treats those expectations as one aspect of a risk-utility
operational rule 55 will continue to admit evidence of industry practice. 56 The
second reason given for the admissibility of evidence of industry practice
in this context is that it demonstrates the lack of feasibility of plaintiff's design
alternative. 57
Courts which recognize a potential correlation between industry practice
and infeasibility assert that they carefully police the admissibility of such
evidence on a case-by-case basis.58 Notwithstanding such policing and the
possibility of giving a specific limiting instruction, it seems more than
arguable that the prejudicial and misleading effect of such "backdoor" custom
outweighs its probative value. If an argument of industry incapability truly
exists, the producer will have access to better evidence of infeasibility than
some inference to be drawn from industry practice. 59 In the words of one
55. See e.g., Turner v. General Motors Corp., 584 S.W.2d 844, 847 (Tex. 1979).
56. See e.g., Carter v. Massey-Ferguson, Inc., 716 F.2d 344,347-49(5th Cir. 1983) (applying
the Law of Texas).
57. Caterpillar Tractor Co. v. Beck, 593 P.2d 871, 887 (Alaska 1979). Cf. Hancock v.
Paccar, Inc., 204 Neb. 468, 283 N.W.2d 25, 35 (1979) (industry custom evidence
admissible but not conclusive in strict liability case). Accord, Chown v. USM Corp.,
297 N.W.2d 218, 221-23 (Iowa 1980); Robinson v. Audi NSU Auto Union A.G., 739
F.2d 1481, 1485-86 (10th Cir. 1984); Carter v. Massey-Ferguson, Inc., 716F.2d 344,
347-49 (5th Cir. 1983) (applying the Law of Texas). See also Smith v. Minster Mach.
Co., 669 F.2d 628, 634 (10th Cir. 1982) ("Industry custom may be relevant to proof
of feasibility of alternatives, but it is not conclusive"). Cf. Sturm, Ruger & Co. v. Day,
594 P.2d 38, 45 (Alaska 1979) (stating that industry practice is admissible but without
explanation as to purpose).
58. See, e.g., Carter v. Massey-Ferguson, Inc., 716 F.2d 344, 349 (5th Cir. 1983) (applying
the Law of Texas).
59. The debate is well represented by Boatland of Houston, Inc., v. Bailey, 609 S.W.2d
743, 746 (1980). According to the majority:
Whether a product was defectively designed must be judged against the tech-
nological context existing at the time of its manufacture .... A plaintiff may advance
the argument that a safer alternative was feasible with evidence that it was in actual
use or was available at the time of manufacture. Feasibility may also be shown
with evidence of the scientific and economic capacity to develop the safer alternative.
... Thus, evidence of the actual use of, or capacity to use, safer alternatives is relevant
insofar as it depicts the available scientific knowledge and the practicalities of
applying that knowledge to a product's design (emphasis added).
Compare, however, the cautionary views of Justice Campbell, 609 S.W.2d at 752-53:
"State of the art" does not mean "the state of industry practice." "State of the
art" means "state of industry knowledge." At the time of the manufacture of the
boat in question, the device and concept of a circuit breaker, as is at issue in this
case, was simple, mechanical, cheap, practical, possible, economically feasible and
a concept seventy years old, which required no engineering or technical break-
through. The concept was known by the industry. This fact removes it from "state
of the art."
... What is this Court faced with in this case? Nothing more than a defendant
seller attempting to avoid liability by offering proof that [plaintiffs' decedent's]
boat complied with industry practice (which it did at that time) but not because
of any limitations on manufacturing feasibility at that time. This is an industry
practice case. The evidence does not involve "technological feasibility." The law
of the majority opinion is that a simple device, not supplied by the manufacturer,
is a defence in a strict liability suit, against a retailer, even though the industry practice
was created by the manufacturing industry.
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court, "[although customs of an industry may be relevant, because those
customs may lag behind technological development, they are not identical
with the state-of-the-art." 60 That "lag" is due to market imperfections in-
volving producer-to-producer and industry-to-consumers information costs.
Similar issues have been raised with regard to close relatives of industry
practice, specifically evidence of an industry's self-regulatory standards and
governmental command control regulations applicable to that industry. Courts
are in general agreement as to the admissibility of the latter. While not
conclusive as a matter of substantive products doctrine,6 1 such standards
consistently are considered to be relevant.6 2 The ostensible reason given by
defendants is that the substance of the standard demonstrates the absence
of technologically feasible alternate designs at the time of the making of the
regulation. However, a more convincing rationale is that the results of an
independent, parallel evaluative process, at the least, are not prejudicial. 63
Industry standards are more problematic. After all, they will have a basis
in the industry's collective view and, hence, in industry custom. 64 Not-
withstanding, such standards tend to be ruled as admissible, 65 ostensibly because
they are probative as to the absence of feasible alternative technologies.66
The opposing view was forcefully championed by the Supreme Court of
Pennsylvania in a defective design case involving a portable control pendant
for an electric hoist.67 The plaintiff-hoist operator had stumbled and struck
a control button on the pendant, causing the hoist to operate which, in turn,
60. O'Brien v. Muskin Corporation, 94 N.J. 169, 463 A.2d 298, 305 (1983) (citations
omitted).
61. See, e.g., Rehler v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 777 F.2d 1072,1083-84(5th Cir. 1985) (applying
the law of Texas); Bruce v. Martin-Marietta Corp., 544 F.2d 442, 446 (10th Cir. 1976);
Blueflame Gas, Inc. v. Van Hoose, 679 P.2d 579 (Colo. 1984); Rucker v. Norfolk &
W. R. Co., 77 Il.2d 434, 33 lIl.Dec. 145, 396 N.E.2d 534, 537 (1979); Gryc v. Dayton-
Hudson Corp., 297 N.W.2d 727 (Minn. 1980), cert. den. 449 U.S. 921,101 S.Ct. 320
(1980); Wilson v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 282 Or. 61, 577 P.2d 1322 (1978).
62. See, e.g., Bruce v. Martin-Marietta Corp., 544 F.2d 442, 446 (10th Cir. 1976); Rucker
v. Norfolk & W. R. Co., 77 l1.2d 434, 33 Ill.Dec. 145, 396 N.E.2d 534 (1979). Cf.
Cover v. Cohen, 61 N.Y.2d 261, 473 N.Y.S.2d 378, 461 N.E.2d 864, 867-69 (1984)
(offensive regulatory standards inadmissible because they post-dated manufacture).
63. The tendency of command-control agencies to use industry practice as a regulatory
baseline, and the more serious question of industry "capture" by an industry group have
not been addressed in this context.
64. See, e.g., Lohrmann v. Pittsburgh Corning Corp., 782 F.2d 1156,1164 (4th Cir. 1986)
(applying the law of Maryland):
Industry standards and state of the art are not synonymous. State of the art includes
all of the available knowledge on a subject at a given time, and this includes scientific,
medical, engineering, and any other knowledge that may be available. State of the
art includes the element of time: What is known and when was this knowledge
available.
Industry standards are the practices common to a given industry. They are often
set forth in some type of code, such as a building code or electrical code, or they
may be adopted by the trade organization of a given industry. State of the art is
a higher standard because scientific knowledge expands much more rapidly than
industry can assimilate the knowledge and adopt it as a standard.
65. See, e.g., Dugan v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 113 Il 1. App.3d 740, 69 Ill.Dec. 620, 447
N.E.2d 1055,1057 (1983) (American National Standards Institute (ANSI) standards).
66. See, e.g., Rexrode v. American Laundry Press Co., 674 F.2d 826, 832 (10th Cir. 1982),
cert. den. 459 U.S. 862, 76 L.Ed.2d 117,103 S.Ct.137 (1982).
67. Lewis v. Coffing Hoist Div., Duff-Norton Co., 515 Pa. 334, 528 A.2d 590 (1987).
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caused his injuries. The plaintiff's defective design theory was that the
possibility of accidental operation of the control pendant could have been
avoided either by recessing the buttons into the control panel, or by raising
metal flanges around them. At trial the defendant sought to introduce evidence
that "at least ninety percent" of such hoists were manufactured without such
modified control boxes. The defendant also sought to introduce standards
promulgated by the American Society of Mechanical Engineers (ASME)
relating to the manufacture of such industrial equipment. The court upheld
the trial court's exclusion of the proffered evidence as follows:
Having reached the conclusion that evidence of industry standards
relating to the design of the control pendant involved in this case, and
evidence of its widespread use in the industry, go to the reasonableness
of the appellant's conduct in making its design choice, we further conclude
that such evidence would have improperly brought into the case concepts
of negligence law. We also conclude that such evidence would have created
a strong likelihood of diverting the jury's attention from the appellant's
control box to the reasonableness of the appellant's conduct in choosing
its design.6 8
The Pennsylvania court, therefore, characterized the state of the art evi-
dence at issue as industry practice, and relied upon the expected rationales
for its exclusion.
69
The division in the decided cases suggests that the question of the ad-
missibility of industry standards, in contrast to industry practice, is not treated
as logically deductible from the design defect operational rule. Therefore,
a jurisdiction's response to such evidence will tend to have independent
operational force further delineating the allocation model in effect. Thus, the
Pennsylvanian decision may be viewed as consistent with its leading case
on defective design,70 which defined defect as "lacking any element necessary
to make it safe for its intended use or possessing any feature that renders
it unsafe for the intended use."7 1 Such a primary operational rule marks out
the jurisdiction as being committed to a strict liability allocation model. The
court's subsequent decision on the admissibility of industry standards in-
dependently confirmed that commitment.
68. Lewis, 528 A.2d at 594. Concurring, Justice Larsen was candid:
The injection of industry standards into a design defect case would be not only
irrelevant and distracting, but also, because of the inherently self-serving nature
of "industry standards," would be highly prejudicial to the consumer/plaintiff. By
our determination today, we have made it clear that a manufacturer cannot avoid
liability to its consumers that it injures or maims through its defective designs by
showing that "the other guys do it too."
528 A.2d at 595.
69. In contrast, Justice Flaherty, in dissent, considered that industry acceptance of the design
(industry practice) went to the ultimate issue of whether the control box was "safe."
528 A.2d at 595, and Justice Hutchinson was of the opinion that the ASME standards
were admissible as akin to expert testimony. 528 A.2d at 596.
70. Azzarello v. Black Bros. Co., 480 Pa. 547, 391 A.2d 1020 (1978).
71. Id., 391 A.2d at 1027.
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B. Failure to Warn
The state of the art issues raised in failure to warn cases differ fundamentally
from those discussed above in the design context. In design cases, the state
of the art disputes primarily are resolvable by reference to a jurisdiction's
operational rules. In contrast, state of the art in warning cases depends upon
the allocation model embraced: the "purity" of the strict liability system
adopted as well as applied in a particular jurisdiction.
This question of purity involves two aspects. First, a marketing defect case
typically involves a useful, but dangerous product which allegedly lacks any
warning or any adequate warning. If the case is of the latter type, the question
arises as to the extent the operational rule of adequacy shades into rea-
sonableness, and reasonableness into negligence'?72 Second, while theprevalent
view in design defect litigation is that the foresight or knowledge of the
product-related risk is imputed to the defendant,7 3 is this proposition accepted
in warning cases? These two questions define the state of the art issues arising
in warning cases; specifically, the admissibility of evidence of industry
practice and industry unknowability.74
72. See generally Freund v. Cellofilm Properties, Inc., 87 N.J. 229, 432 A.2d 925, 929-
31(1981). See also In re Hawaii Federal Asbestos Cases, 699 F.Supp. 233, 236 (D.
Hawaii 1988) (failure to warn' is misleading because it implies negligent concepts
with their attendant focus on the reasonableness of defendants' behavior.").
73. Text accompanying note 31, supra.




Foresight Rule Adequacy Rule Exclude Evidence Of
Negligence Actual/constructive conduct-oriented n/a
Strict Actual/constructive product-oriented industry custom
Strict Rebuttable presumption product-oriented industry custom
of knowledge by
defendant
Strict "Expert" standard- product-oriented industry custom
effectively placing
burden on defence
Strict Knowledge at time product-oriented industry custom
of manufacture imputed industry unknowability
at time of manufacture
"Stricter" Imputed product-oriented industry custom
industry unknowability
Note that the evidentiary exclusionary rule be given in each case is the one logically
derived from that jurisdiction's substantive rule as to foresight of risk or adequacy of
warning, i.e., those exclusionary rules are not independent operational rules. However,
ajurisdiction could abandon such logic and achieve a composite (substance plus evidentiary
exclusion) rule with subtlely different allocational results. For example, although it would
be structurally inconsistent, a jurisdiction with a product-oriented adequacy rule could
admit evidence of industry custom. This would produce a composite rule which should
have an allocational effect somewhere between the first two entries on the above chart.
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Some jurisdictions slavishly follow the lead of the Restatement, 75 and
explicitly treat warning cases as negligence-based. 76 Others, at least formally,
have adopted a strict liability allocation model in warning cases, yet have
measured the producer's knowledge at the time of marketing, not trial.77 At
the extreme, a few jurisdictions have attempted to carry over both strict
liability operational rules - the product-oriented approach and imputed fore-
sight - from the design to warning arenas. For example, according to the
Supreme Court of New Jersey:
[A] products liability charge in an inadequate warning case must focus
on safety and emphasize that a manufacturer, in marketing a product with
an inadequate warning as to its dangers, has not satisfied its duty to warn,
even if the product is perfectly inspected, designed, and manufactured.
Moreover, and importantly, the charge must make clear that knowledge
of the dangerous trait of the product is imputed to the manufacturer. It
must also include the notion that the warning be sufficient to adequately
protect any and all foreseeable users from hidden dangers presented by
the product. This duty must be said to attach without regard to prevailing
industry standards. In short, it must be explained that an adequate warning
is one that includes the directions, communications, and information
essential to make the use of a product safe.
78
Clearly, this invocation of strict liability orthodoxy suggests tentative
answers to state of the art issues identified above.79 First, by adopting a
product-oriented approach the court implies that evidence of industry custom
(industry practice) is irrelevant. Indeed the court's express discounting of
"prevailing industry standards" also might suggest disavowal of evidence of
self-regulatory standards (industry standards), or governmental regulations
pertaining to the industry (regulatory standards). Second, the court imputes
knowledge of the risk to the manufacturer. This implies that knowledge of
the risk (or lack thereof) which the contended-for warning would have
eliminated or reduced ceases to be in issue; in other words, that evidence
of industry unknowability is irrelevant.
75. See Restatement (Second) of Torts § 402A, comment i.
76. See, e.g., Cristip v. TCH Liquidating Co, 52 Ohio St.3d 251, 556 N.E.2d 1177,1182-
83 (1990),
Under either a negligence or strict liability theory, the important factors for the jury
to consider were whether the defendant knew or should have known of the danger
and whether the warning allowed the consumer to use the product safely .... Thus,
the standard imposed upon the defendant in a strict liability claim grounded upon
inadequate warning is the same as that imposed in a negligence claim based upon
inadequate warning.
See also Higgins v. E.I. Du Pont de Nemours & Co. Inc., 671 F.Supp. 1055,1060 (D.
Md. 1987); Knitz v. Minster Machine Co., 69 Ohio St.2d 460, 23 Ohio Op.3d 403,
432 N.E.2d 814, 818 n.5, cert. den. 459 U.S. 857,74 L.Ed.2d 110,103 S.Ct. 127 (1982).
77. See note 114 infra.
78. Freund v. Cellofilm Properties, Inc., 87 N.J. 229,432 A.2d 925, 932 (1981). Decisions
from New Jersey discussed herein must be read subject to N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2A:58C-
1 to 58C-7(West 1987).
79. Text accompanying notes 72 to 74, supra.
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This approach is not without merit. It is agreeably strict and guarantees
an increased redistribution of product-related injuries. It suffers, however,
from two significant flaws: one conceptual, the other involving what may
loosely be described as "justice" concerns. The former involves the nature
of operational rule necessitated by such an approach. That is, what is the
content of the adequacy test for the warning if conduct-oriented evidence
is excluded? It seems somewhat ingenuous to answer this question with a
construct phrased in terms of "safe" versus "unsafe."'80 After all, the only
evidence on this issue remaining before the jury is that the plaintiff was injured
in spite of the warning, thus seeming to compel the conclusion that the product
was unsafe, and hence the conclusory characterization of the warning as
"inadequate." 8
1
Traditional products liability operational rules have struggled to establish
themselves in the warning area. At first glance a consumer expectations
approach seems appropriate to gauge whether a producer has sufficiently
reduced the user's information costs so that the user is a cost-effective accident
cost avoider viz-a-viz the product. 82 As an operational rule, however,
consumer expectations is only slightly more convincing in warning cases than
in design defect litigation. Interestingly, in the warning context, risk-utility
has engendered little enthusiasm as a practical decisional tool. Presumably,
this is the result of the perception that such an analysis would involve nothing
more than a simplistic and lop-sided comparison between the cost of a label
and the injuries suffered by the consumer. 83 Arguably, such "an invitation
to convict" would then be contrary to the allocation model in that it would
redistribute too many product-related risks. Yet, a risk-utility analysis could
be fashioned so as to provide meaningful content for jury decision and still
80. See, e.g., Freund, text accompanying note 78, supra. Freund itself expressed a slightly
different explanation for the kinship between negligent and strict liability approaches
to warning cases:
The reason for the elusive nature of the differences between the approaches in
inadequate warning cases relates to the basic theory of strict products liability.
Central to this theory is the risk-utility equation for determining liability. The theory
is that only safe products should be marketed - a safe product being one whose
utility outweighs its inherent risk, provided that risk has been reduced to the greatest
extent possible consistent with the product's continued utility. In the case of a design
defect consisting of an inadequate warning, however, imposing the requirements
of a proper warning will seldom detract from the utility of the product. It can readily
be assumed that if a reasonable manufacturer can make his product safe without
impairing its utility, failure to do so would constitute negligence. This explains why,
in an inadequate warning case, the product-oriented and conduct-oriented approaches
appear similar.
432 A.2d at 930 n.l.
81. See also Antcliff v. State Employees Credit Union, 414 Mich. 624, 327 N.W.2d 814,
820 (1982) (in a case decided on the court noted "the information provided must be
adequate, accurate and effective").
82. See, e.g., Little v. PPG Industries, Inc., 92 Wash.2d 118,122, 594 P.2d 911,914 (1979)
("Was the warning sufficient to catch the attention of persons who could be expected
to use the product to apprise them of its dangers and to advise them of the measures
to take to avoid those dangers?").
83. See, e.g., Morningstar v. Black & Decker Mfg. Co., 162 W.Va. 857, 253 S.E.2d 666,
682-83 (1979).
ANGLO-AMERICAN LAW REVIEW
be consistent with the allocation model. 84 Such an analysis would mirror the
risk-utility analysis as applied in design defect cases. That is, some cases
would involve a comparison of the costs of warning against the risks which
occurred, while others would compare the relative costs of plaintiff's contended
for warning in contrast to the defendant's actual warning.
85
In either case, the challenge is to provide the warning cost with sufficient
content to provide a sensible and purposeful counterpoint to an easily identified
risk. The key to that "cost content" is contained in the rationale for the duty
to warn: the producer and consumer should become jointly responsible for
accident cost avoidance. The adequacy test as currently applied focuses on
the costs of communication of risk information from producer to consumer.
86
Those costs are important aspects of the mix and should continue to be at
issue.87 Equally important, however, are the relative information costs as to
the existence, quantification and avoidance of the risk incurred by the
producer88 and the consumer.89
The second flaw in this pure, strict liability construct goes to the exclusion
of evidence of industry unknowability and undiscoverability. Indeed, at an
instinctive level it does seem somewhat discordant to command a manufac-
84. See generally Twerski, Weinstein, Donaher & Piehler, The Use and Abuse of Warnings
in Products Liability-Design Defect Litigation Comes of Age, 61 Cornell L.Rev. 495,
513-21(1976).
85. See text accompanying note 20, supra.
86. This a pproach probably derives from the discussion of the negligence duty in Restate-
ment (Second) of Torts § 388 comment n.
87. For example, physical construction or formulation of a label (see, e g., Davis v. FMC
Corp., Food Processing Machinery Div., 771 F.2d 224 (7th Cir. 1985) (warning in-
adequate, inter alia, because decal easily washed off); method of attachment (see, e.g.,
Ilosky v. Michelin Tire Corp., 307 S.E.2d 603, 611 (W.Va. 1983); feasibility of warning
of a small group of particularly susceptible or hypersensitive users (see, e.g., Griggs
v. Combe, Inc., 456 So.2d 790 (Ala. 1984)); labelling which tends to increase the
consumer's information costs because of the necessity of reducing type size in order
to increase the quantity of information applied to a package of finite size; the costs
associated with increasing the size of packaging to accommodate increased information
(see, e.g., Cotton v.Buckeye Gas Products Co., 840 F.2d 935 (D.C. Cir. 1988)); increasing
information costs by mixing safety representations with warnings (see, e.g., Gracyalny
v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 723 F.2d 1311,1321 (7th Cir. 1983) (applying the law
of Wisconsin)).
88. Note that this cost of discovering probability and severity of risk differs from the issue
of actual/constructive/imputed foresight because the courts are not asking whether the
manufacturer knew or should have known, but how much it would cost to know. See,
e.g., O'Brien v Muskin Corporation, 94 N.J. 169, 463 A.2d 298, 305 (1983) ("the risk
side of the equation may involve, among other factors, risks that the manufacturer knew
or should have known would be posed by the product, as well as the adequacy of any
warnings"); llosky v. Michelin Tire Corp., 307 S.E.2d 603, 611 (W.Va. 1983) (in casu
risk information inexpensive). See also Hayes v. Ariens Company, 391 Mass. 407, 462
N.E.2d 273, 277 (1984) ("the adequacy of a wanting is measured by the warning that
would be given at the time of sale by an ordinarily prudent vendor who, at that time,
is fully aware of the risks presented by the product").
89. What else could be in issue? The obviousness of the risk, etc.? But what we are then
pointing to are occasions of the plaintiff failing to act as an accident avoider and those
should be handled with affirmative defences not with the plaintiff's prima facie case
Note also that the information costs incurred by a "learned intermediary" will be
lower. See, e.g. Abbot v. American Cyanamid Co., 844 F.2d 1108,1115 (4th Cir. 1988),
cert. den. 488 U.S. 908,102 L.Ed.2d 248,109 S.Ct. 260 (1988) (applying the law of
Virginia).
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turer to warn against an unknowable hazard.90 However, a more oblique
approach to the issue is profitable. Why is the abandonment of an imputed
foresight operational rule in warning cases dictated by considerations of
fairness,9 1 insurer rate-setting,92 or a lack of conviction of any promotion
of social utility? 93 In contrast, courts in design cases do not hesitate to impute
foresight, to premise liability on hindsight.94 What has happened is that most
courts have abandoned the search for any meaningful content for the question
of adequacy of warning. Faced, therefore, with operational rules (adequacy
essentially determined by showing injury and imputed foresight) which seem
consistent with an absolute liability allocation model, those courts have"rediscovered" the foresight issue to act as the only meaningful
(or "contentful") operational rule in warning cases.
The leading case of Beshada v. Johns-Manville Products Corp.,95 focused
attention on many of these issues. Plaintiffs sought to strike defendants' so-
called state of the art defence, which was premised on the scientific
unknowability and undiscoverability of the risks of low concentrations of
asbestos dust. Plaintiffs argued from the orthodox position on defendant
knowledge, that the doctrine of imputed foresight of the risk renders evidence
of, and hence any defence based on, unknowability and undiscoverability
irrelevant.
Defendants countered with a timing issue, arguing that the imputed
knowledge doctrine applied to knovwledge existing at the time of manufacture,
rather than at trial. In rejecting plaintiffs' motion to strike, the trial judge
advanced an intermediate position: that the imputed foresight rule created
only a presumption of foresight which could be rebutted by evidence of
unknowability and undiscoverability. 96 Responding, the Supreme Court of
New Jersey was unwavering in the face of what it considered to be an attempted
dilution of the strict liability concept.
Two aspects of the court's rejection of the proffered evidence and reaf-
firmation of the doctrine of imputed knowledge are noteworthy. First, the
intensity of the court's response serves to emphasize once again the impor-
tance of clearly distinguishing between the various species of state of the
art evidence. The court stated "[e]ssentially, state-of-the-art is a negligence
defence. It seeks to explain why defendants are not culpable for failing to
provide a warning." 97 Yet, taken literally, that blanket exclusion apparently
90. See, e.g., Moore v. Vanderloo, 386 N.W.2d 108,116 (Iowa 1986); Castrignano v. E.R.
Squibb & Sons, Inc., 546 A.2d 775, 782-83 (R.I.1988); Anderson v. Owens-Illinois,
Inc., 799 F.2d 1, 4-5 (1 st Cir. 1986) (applying the law of Massachusetts). See generally
Comment, Requiring Omniscience: The Duty to Warn of Scientifically Undiscoverable
Product Defects, 71 Geo L.J. 1635 (1983).
91. See, e.g., Heath v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 123 N.H. 512, 464 A.2d 288, 298-99 (1983).
92. See, e.g., Anderson v. Owens-Illinois, Inc., 799 F.2d 1, 5 (1st Cir. 1986) (applying the
law of Massachusetts).
93. See, e.g., Henderson, Coping with the Time Dimension in Products Liability, 69 Calif.
L.Rev. 919, 949 (1981).
94. See text accompanying note 51, supra.
95. 90 N.J. 191, 447 A.2d 539 (1982).
96. 447 A.2d at 543.
97. 447 A.2d at 546.
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would deny the admissibility of evidence of industry capability in design
cases, rather than the evidence of industry unknowability at issue. Beshada
reinforced its opposition to evidence of industry unknowability and
undiscoverability by making reference to the products liability postulate that
"[s]trict liability focuses on the product, not the fault of the manufacturer." 98
However, risk-identification and legal defectiveness do not constitute an
homogenized issue.99 Logically, a jurisdiction may adopt a product-oriented
standard to judge the adequacy of a warning, yet utilize a risk-identification
rule lacking the strictness of imputation.1°
Second, the court was swift to recognize that a state of the art defence
phrased in the terms urged by defendant (industry unknowability and
undiscoverability at a time prior to trial) constituted a frontal assault on the
doctrine of imputed foresight in warning cases. Thus, Beshada answered the
state of the art issue with a recitation of the conventional rationales for a
strict products liability allocation model,10 1 concluding:
We impose strict liability because it is unfair for the distributors of a
defective product not to compensate its victims. As between those innocent
victims and the distributors, it is the distributors - and the public which
consumes their products - which should bear the unforeseen costs of the
product. 102
Beshada's operational rules are brutally simple. Product performance risks
are allocated between producers and consumers on a case-by-case, product-
oriented and arguably contentless "adequacy of warning" basis. However,
risks associated with risk-identification, notwithstanding their attendant
information costs, may not be externalized to the consumer. 103
The question remains, however, whether an imputed foresight rule in
warning cases is consistent with a strict liability allocation model, whether
the operational rule is too strict? 104 Producers transliterate this concern into
98. 447 A.2d at 546.
99. Text accompanying notes 29 and 52 supra.
100. See note 74, supra.
101. 447 A.2d at 547-49.
102. 447 A.2d at 549.
103. Beshada is not alone. See Kisor v. Johns-ManvilleCorp.,783 F.2d 1337 (9th Cir.1986)
(applying the law of Washington); In re Hawaii Federal Asbestos Cases, 665 F.Supp.
1454,1457-60 (D. Hawaii 1986); Hayes v. Ariens Company, 391 Mass. 407,462 N.E.2d
273 (1984).
104. See, e.g., O'Brien v. Muskin Corporation, 94 N.J. 169, 463 A.2d 298,310-15 (1983)(per
Schreiber, J., concurring and dissenting). A risk should be warned about before it is
known or definitely established, or even where the manufacturer finds the evidence
of risk to be unconvincing. See Moran v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 691 F.2d 811,
814-15 (6th Cir. 1982) (applying the law of Ohio). A similar issue arises in malpractice
cases premised on an absence of informed consent - a duty to warn attaches "whenever
a reasonable man would want to be informed of the risk in order to decide whether
to expose himself to it." Borel v. Fibreboard Paper Products Corporation, 493 F.2d
1076,1089 (5th Cir. 1973) (per Wisdom, J.), cert. den. 419 U.S. 869, 42 L.Ed.2d 107,
95 S.Ct, 127 (1974). Thus arises the question whether the adequacy of the information
transmitted should be judged by a "need to know" (consumer) test, a custom/subjective
manufacturer test, or - the intermediate step - by an expert/objective manufacturer test?
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an absolute liability argument.10 5 That argument is resisted with an assertion
such as, "defendants are not absolutely liable because plaintiffs are never
relieved of their primary burden of proof, that of establishing the product's
dangerousness by a preponderance of the evidence." 1°6 But that begs once
again the core question: what is the (decisional, evaluative) content of
"dangerousness" if it is not, as seems to follow from that rebuttal, simply"causing harm?" Pronouncements on the functional goals of risk spreading
and accident cost avoidance are compatible with a movement from a strict
to a "stricter" allocation model; however, they do not explain the content
of either model's operational rule.
Indeed, except in jurisdictions seeking that "stricter" form of products
liability, 10 7 Beshada has not been warmly received. In the words of the
Supreme Court of California:
Numerous cases have recognized that a product may be defective
because of the absence of a warning that was necessary to allow its safe
use. While some decisions apply strict liability principles to such a defect
by holding that it is irrelevant whether the manufacturer knew of the danger
or should have known of it, most jurisdictions hold to the contrary. That
is, liability is conditioned on the actual or constructive knowledge of the
risk by the manufacturer as of the time the product was sold or distributed.
This rule is consistent with comment j to section 402A, which confines
the duty to warn to a situation in which the seller 'has knowledge, or by
the application of reasonable, developed human skill and foresight should
have knowledge of ... the danger. ' 10 8
That reaction to Beshada and its prodigy has involved an unfortunate
renaissance of judicial interest in commentj to the Restatement.l°9 Comment
j provides an historically proven doctrinal statement rejecting imputed fore-
105. See, e.g., In re Hawaii Federal Asbestos Cases, 699 F.Supp. 233, 236 (D. Hawaii 1988)
("Defendants maintain that imposing strict liability on a manufacturer for failure to
warn of an unknown risk is tantamount to making the manufacturer an absolute insurer
of its product"). See also Heath v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 123 N.H. 512, 464 A.2d
288, 298 (1983) (describing Beshada as involving absolute liability).
106. In re Hawaii Federal Asbestos Cases, 699 F.Supp. 233, 236 (D. Hawaii 1988).
107. See, e.g., Elmore v. Owens-Illinois, Inc., 673 S.W.2d 434, 438 (Mo. 1984) ("the law
in Missouri holds that state of the art evidence has no bearing on the outcome of a
strict liability claim"); Nesselrode v. Executive Beechcraft, Inc., 707 S.W.2d 371, 383
(Mo. 1986) ("liability may be imposed without regard to the defendant's knowledge
or conduct"). See also cases cited in note 103. supra.
108. Brown v. Superior Court, 44 Cal.3d 1049, 245 Cal.Rptr. 412,751 P.2d 470, 480 (1988)
(citations omitted). See also Lohrmann v. Pittsburgh Corning Corp., 782 F.2d 1156,1164-
65 (4th Cir. 1986) (applying the law of Maryland); Church v. Wesson, 385 S.E.2d
393, 396 (W.Va. 1989); Anderson v. Owens-Illinois, Inc., 799 F.2d 1, 4-5 (1st Cir.
1986) (applying the law of Massachusetts); Anderson v. Owens-Corning Fiberglas
Corp., 53 Cal. 3d 987, 810 P.2d 549 (1991).
109. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 402A comment j provides in part:
- .. Where, however, the product contains an ingredient [which] . .. is one whose
danger is not generally known, or if known is one which the consumer would reasonably
not expect to find in the product, the seller is required to give warning against it, if
he has knowledge, or by the application of reasonable, developed human skill and
foresight should have knowledge, of the presence of the ingredient and the danger.
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sight in warning cases. 110 Inevitably, it prompts courts to search for some
middle ground for warning cases. Logically, in jurisdictions committed to
a strict liability allocation model, such a search first should alight upon a
warning operational rule which combines actual/constructive foresight with
a product-oriented adequacy standard.111 Instead, courts have a tendency to
equate rejection of imputed foresight with movement to a conduct-oriented
standard,112 which merely results in a form of "stricter" negligence. 113
The implications for state of the art evidence are serious. Rejection of the
imputed foresight operational rule involves no more than the admissibility
of defence evidence of scientific unknowability and undiscoverability at the
time of marketing. Indeed, recognition of the product-oriented adequacy
standard/foresight rule duopoly is one of the keys to forging an operational
rule for warning cases which avoids Beshada's possible inconsistency with
the allocation model. The otherkey is continued resistance to the admissibility
of evidence of industry custom. Crucial to the strict liability warning allocation
model is the maintenance of an operational rule which is product-oriented
and, therefore, insusceptible to custom evidence. 114 By homogenizing
foresight and conduct-orientation a court opens the door to evidence of
industry practice.115
Nowhere have these issues, accompanied by a microcosmic illustration
of judicial retrenchment from the strict liability allocation model, been more
keenly illustrated than in Feldman v. Lederle Laboratories,116 decided by
the New Jersey Supreme Court two years after its decision in Beshada. Clearly
110. See, e.g., Bernier v. Raymark Industries, Inc., 516 A.2d 534. 538 (Me. 1986). Cf. In
re HawaiiFederalAsbestos Cases, 699 F.Supp. 233,236n.3 (D. Hawaii 1988) (comment
j "only applies to products which cause allergic reactions in the general population").
111. See note 114, supra.
112. See, e.g., Bernier v. Raymark Industries, Inc., 516 A.2d 534, 538-40 (Me. 1986). In
a sense this was invited by Beshada; see note 30, supra. In a sense this was also invited
by Restatement (Second) of Torts § 388, which suggests that the content of the warning
issue is producer foresight. It was left to Restatement (Second) of Torts § 388 comment
n to suggest a content to "adequacy."
113. See, e.g., Bernier v. Raymark Industries, Inc., 516 A.2d 534, 538 (Me. 1986) ("A
manufacturer is held to the knowledge and skill of'an expert, and is required to test
his products and keep abreast of scientific discoveries related to his products, but he
has a duty to warn only of dangers that the employment of the reasonable foresight
of an expert could reveal."). See also Borel v. Fibreboard Paper Products Corporation,
493 F.2d 1076, 1083 (5th Cir. 1973), cert. den. 419 U.S. 869,95 S.Ct. 127, 42 L.Ed.2d
107 (1974); Feldman v. Lederle Laboratories, 97 N.J. 429,479 A.2d 374,386-88 (1984)
("expert" standard with burden of proof shifted to defendant); Dartez v. Fibreboard
Corp., 765 F.2d 456, 461 (5th Cir. 1985).
114. See, e.g., Bly v. Otis Elevator Co., 713 E2d 1040,1045-46 (4th Cir.1983) (applying
the law of Virginia); Tomer v. American Home Products Corp., 170 Conn. 681, 368
A.2d 35, 38 (1976); Castrignano v. E.R. Squibb & Sons, Inc., 546 A.2d 775, 782-83
(R.I. 1988); Anderson v. Owens-Illinois, Inc., 799 F.2d 1, 4-5 (1st Cir. 1986) (applying
the law of Massachusetts); Feldman v. Lederle Laboratories, 97 N.J. 429, 479 A.2d
374, 385 (1984); Anderson v. Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corp., 53 Cal. 3d 987, 810
P.2d 549 (1991). See also Woodill v. Parke Davis & Co., 79 ll1.2d 26,37 IlI.Dec. 304,
402 NE.2d 194,198 (1980) (combining actual/constructive foresight with product-
oriented adequacy standard).
115. See, e.g., Bernier v. Raymark Industries, Inc., 516 A.2d 534, 540 (Me. 1986) ("A strict
liability failure-to-warn case does resemble a negligence action because the reasona-
bleness of the manufacturer's conduct is the critical issue.")
116. 97 N.J. 429, 479 A.2d 374 (1984).
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failing to recognize the adequacy/knowledge of risk duopoly suggested here,
Feldman modified Beshada's operational rules to such an extent that the
allocation model was implicitly shifted from strict liability to negligence.
For Feldman, the operational rule for legal defectiveness in warning and
design cases was the "reasonably prudent manufacturer" test.117 Contrary
to the court's own pronouncement that strict liability was product-oriented,1 18
and contrary also to the orthodox meaning assigned to the reasonable
manufacturer standard in this context, as synonymous with risk-utility, 119
Feldman reintroduced the reasonableness of the defendant's conduct into the
analysis. It was then but a short step to citing the admissibility of evidence
of industry capability in design cases as persuasive authority for admitting
evidence of industry unknowability in warning cases. 120
YetFeldman saved its most stunning contribution for last, when it restricted
Beshada to "the circumstances giving rise to its holding.'121 Such a product-
specific characterization, as bizarre 122 as it is disturbing for basic "justice"
reasons, must be viewed as part of a collective judicial determination that
the asbestos industry did know of the risks associated with its product, maybe
as early as the 1930's.123 This then fed the conclusion that the industry should
not be permitted to continue to litigate the issue. 124 In Beshada itself, the
court had justified the exclusion of state of the art in part because the
availability of such evidence depended on how much the industry was willing
to invest in research at a given time. 125 The evidence would be confusing,
117. "The question in strict-liability-design-defect and warning cases is whether, assuming
that the manufacturer knew of the defect in the product, he acted in a reasonably prudent
manner in marketing the product or in providing the warnings given." Feldman, 479
A.2d at 385.
118. 479 A.2d at 385.
119. I.e., a normative, reasonable manufacturer who always uses the safest, technologically
feasible technology. See note 15, supra.
120. 479 A.2d at 386.
121. 479 A.2d at 388.
122. It is not, however, a unique occurrence. A similar dynamic has existed in the causation/
defendant identification cases with regard to generic type products and multiple potential
manufacturers. While the form of causation-burden shifting rule known as market-share
liability frequently has been applied in DES cases (see, e.g., Sindell v. Abbott Labo-
ratories, 26 Cal.3d 588,163 Cal.Rptr. 132, 607 P.2d 924, cert. den. 449 U.S. 912,101
S.Ct. 285, 66 L.Ed.2d 140 (1980)), it has been rejected with regard to other products
(see, e.g., Shackil v. Lederle Laboratories, Div. of American Cyanamid, Co., 116 N.J.
155, 561 A.2d 511 (1989) (DPT vaccine), including asbestos (see, e.g., Celotex Corp.
v. Copeland, 471 So.2d 533 (Fla. 1985).
123. See, e.g., Hardy v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 509 F.Supp. 1353, 1355 (E.D. Tex.
1981). Much of this debate centers on the "Sumner-Simpson" papers; see Lohrmann
v. Pittsburgh Corning Corp., 782 F.2d 1156,1159-60 (4th Cir. 1986) (applying the law
of Maryland). See also Moran v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 691 F.2d 811, 814-15
(6th Cir. 1982) (applying the law of Ohio) (discussion of "Fleischer-Drinker" study);
Dartez v. Fibreboard Corp., 765 F.2d 456, 460-63 (5th Cir. 1985) (testimony of semor
physician employed by Johns-Manville between 1944 and 1966).
124. Clearly the undiscoverability/unknowabiity argument is effective in front of a jury in
asbestos cases. See, e.g., Wilson v. Johns Manville Sales Corp., 873 F.2d 869, 870 (5th
Cir. 1989); Hardy v. Johns.Manville Sales Corp., 681 F.2d 334, 345 (5th Cir. 1982).
Cf. Jenkins v. Raymark Industries, Inc., 782 F.2d 468, 472-73 (5th Cir. 1986) (class
certification would be consistent with determination of state of the art).
125. 447 A.2d at 549.
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making the trial complicated, costly, and time consuming. 126 The Beshada
decision subsequently withstood constitutional attacks before the Court of
Appeals for the Third Circuit; attacks premised on equal protection and due
process grounds. 127 One of the two judges in that majority felt that elimination
of the state-of-the-art defence in asbestos litigation was justified on grounds
of administrative convenience, and that the manufacturers probably knew
of the danger at all relevant times. 128 The other judge felt the Beshada court
had determined the knowability of asbestos dangers as a matter of "legislative
fact," or judicial notice.
Therefore, Feldman illustrates not simply retrenchment, but also how the
ambivalence associated with the strict liability allocation model partly is
rooted in the judicial frustration associated with identification of specific
classes of cases in which the logically derived operational rules provide for
false negatives. The appropriate reaction, of course, is to modify the allocation
model, not to distort the operational rules. Louisiana, alone, 129 adopted a
separate, "stricter" category of product defectiveness for case-by-case ap-
plication to products such as asbestos. 130 Such a case is premised on whether"a reasonable person would conclude that the danger-in-fact of the product,
whether foreseeable or not, outweighs the utility of the product." 131
Demonstrating admirable consistency, a contemporaneously announced op-
erational rule excluded evidence of industry unknowability and incapabil-
ity. 132
V. Conclusion
State of the art did not begin its existence as an explicit operational rule.
However, as it became a touchstone for the application of primary operational
rules consistent with a strict liability allocation model, so too producers fuelled
the concept's departure from its status as an apparently logically derived
evidentiary rule derived from a jurisdiction's defectiveness operational rule.
Prior to this development, state of the art typically was raised as the plaintiff
126. 484 So.2d at 119.
127. In re Asbestos Litigation, 829 F.2d 1233 (3d Cir. 1987), cert. den. 485 U.S. 1029, 99
L.Ed.2d 901,108 S.Ct. 1586 (1988).
128. See also Feldman 479 A.2d at 388:
We note, in passing, that, although not argued and determined in Beshada, there were
or may have been data and other information generally available, aside from scientific
knowledge, that arguably could have alerted the manufacturer at an early stage in the
distribution of its product to the dangers associated with its use.
129. Halphen v. Johns.Manville Sales Corp., 484 So.2d 110 (La. 1986), rev'd in part LA.
Rev. Stat. Ann. § 9:2800.59 (West Supp. 1989).
130. See, e.g., Valenti v. Surgiteck-Flash Medical Engineering Corp., 875 F.2d 466, 468
(5th Cir. 1989) (applying the law of Louisiana) (assumed rationale was the reduction
of the costs of asbestos litigation).
131. Halphen, 484 So.2d at 114.
132. Id., 484 So.2d at 114 "The fact that a risk or hazard related to the use of a duct was
not discoverable under existing technology or that the benefits appeared greater than
they actually were are both irrelevant."
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attempted to exclude certain types of defensive evidence. 133 That escalated
into a defence interest in an advantageous instruction based on state of the
art, 134 a defence interest that typically has been turned back at the instruction
conference. 135 The process language favored by defendants has not been lost
on state legislatures or judges ambivalent to the products liability allocation
model. It should be no surprise that legislatures which have "reformed" their
products liability law frequently have translated prior semantic inexactitude
into doctrinal fact. 136
What is surprising is the quite dramatic effect that the complexities of
state of the art and its allocational possibilities have had on courts apparently
once committed to a strict liability allocation model. In design defect cases,
the relatively long-standing risk-utility operational rule has been an effective
barrier to serious retrenchment from the strict liability allocation model,
although dubious claims of the relevance of industry practice and industry
standards to the capability issue persist. The state of the art issue in warning
cases should have engendered are-assessmentof the suitability of the adequacy
operational rule and, possibly, a fine-tuning of the allocation model through
the introduction of additional operational rules. Instead, acknowledgment of
the challenging issues posed has been followed by an intellectually dissat-
isfying stampede back to the clutches of a negligence-based allocation model.
133. See, e.g., Lewis v. Cofing Hoist Div., Duff.Norton Co., Inc., 515 Pa. 334, 528 A.2d
590, 594 (1987) ("It is well established that a trial court should exclude evidence which
has a tendency to distract the jury from its main inquiry or confuse the issue").
134. See, e.g., Beshada v. Johns-Manville Products Corp., N.J. 191,447 A.2d 539, 543-
545 (1982).
135. See Boatland of Houston, Inc. v. Bailey, 609 S.W.2d 743,749 n.3 Tex. 1980), admitting
evidence of industry capability as discussed at text accompanying note 59, infra, yet
noting:
This op inion, insofar as it holds that certain evidence of the state of the art is
admissible on the issue of defectiveness in product design cases, is not intended
to suggest that such evidence constitutes a defence, such as do misuse and assumption
of the risk. Nor does evidence of the state of the art entitle the defendant to a defensive
issue inquiring whether it complied with the state of the art at the time of manufacture.
See also Dreiling v. General Electric Co., 511 F.2d 768,776 n.9 (5th Cir. 1975); Smith
v. Minster Mach. Co., 669 F.2d 628, 633 (10th Cir. 1982); Beshada, note 134, supra
at 546: "A state-of-the-art defence would ... [require] plaintiffs to prove at least that
knowledge of the dangers was scientifically available at the time of manufacture"
(emphasis added).
136. See, e.g., Colo. Rev. Stat. §13-21-403(l)(a)(b) (compliance with industry capability
creates rebuttable presumption of non defectiveness); Ind. Code § 33-1-1.5-4 (broadly
stated state of the art affirmative defence); Neb. Rev. Stat. § 25-21,182 (1985) (com-
pliance with "the best technology reasonably available at the time" labelled a "defence");
Mo. Rev. Stat. § 537.764 (1988) (industry unknowability and undiscoverability an
affirmative defence in warning cases). See also La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 9:2800.59 (West
Supp. 1989). Cf. Colo. Rev. Stat. § 13-21-404 (1989) (makes inadmissible certain types
of offensive industry capability evidence); § 13-21-403(2) (1989) (noncompliance with
regulatory standard creates rebuttable presumption of defectiveness).
See generally Note, Product Liability Reform Proposals: The State of the Art
Defence, 43 Alb. L.Rev. 941(1979); Heath v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 123 N.H. 512,
464 A.2d 288, 298-99 (1983) (industry unknowability state of the art provision held
constitutional in itself but not severable from general products liability reform statute).
